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Perceptual inference is biased by foreknowledge
about what is probable or possible. How prior expec-
tations are neurally represented during visual per-
ception, however, remains unknown. We used func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging to measure
brain activity in humans judging simple visual stimuli.
Perceptual decisions were either biased in favor of
a single alternative (A/A decisions) or taken without
bias toward either choice (A/B decisions). Extrastri-
ate and anterior temporal lobe regions were more
active during A/A than A/B decisions, suggesting
multiple representations of prior expectations within
the visual hierarchy. Forward connectivity was in-
creased when expected and observed perception
diverged (‘‘prediction error’’ signals), whereas prior
expectations fed backward from higher to lower
regions. Finally, the coincidence between expected
and observed perception activated orbital prefrontal
regions, perhaps reflecting the reinforcement of prior
expectations. These data support computational and
quantitative models proposing that a visual percept
emerges from converging bottom-up and top-down
signals.
INTRODUCTION
At the heart of psychophysical theory is the notion that there ex-
ists a metric linking a physical stimulus with internal percept (Ste-
vens, 1957). Classical models of perceptual decisions incorpo-
rate this feedforward model, in that physical sensory input is
serially accumulated toward a threshold or criterion for response
(Ratcliff, 1978), presumably as stimulus information feeds for-
ward through sensory neocortex and on to the higher brain (Hee-
keren et al., 2004; Kim and Shadlen, 1999). However, perception
is also shaped by reciprocal interactions between an internal
mental state and the external information impinging upon it.
This reciprocity is evident in a range of neurocognitive phenom-
ena in which evoked cortical responses are modulated by prior
expectations or motivational states. For example, in the visual
domain, prior contextual information is responsible for the336 Neuron 59, 336–347, July 31, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.elementary constancies that influence our perception of shape
and color (Land, 1977), innate statistical biases in the processing
of natural images (Kersten et al., 2004), as well as the effects of
learning (Gilbert et al., 2001), local environmental context (Bar,
2004; Palmer, 1975), or task set (O’Craven et al., 1999) on the
processing of visual objects and scenes.
Although it is well established that prior information influences
perceptual inference, consensus has yet to emerge on how this
finding should be incorporated into accounts of the decision pro-
cess. Moreover, while neuroscientists have begun to character-
ize the forward flow of neural information during decisions with
two visual alternatives (Heekeren et al., 2004; Kim and Shadlen,
1999), much less is known about the brain mechanisms that un-
derpin the ‘‘top-down’’ influences on signal detection and object
recognition (Frith and Dolan, 1997; Gilbert and Sigman, 2007;
Kveraga et al., 2007b). Several quantitative and computational
theories have proposed that backward (or ‘‘reentrant’’) connec-
tions within the ventral stream allow prior information to flow
back to visual regions and guide object decisions as they unfold
(Deco and Rolls, 2005; Friston, 2003; Grossberg, 1999; Mum-
ford, 1992; Ullman, 1995). For example, one recent model de-
scribes how a percept evolves as sensory information travels
through successive stages of a hierarchically organized cortical
architecture (Friston, 2003; Mumford, 1992). Under this frame-
work—known as ‘‘predictive coding’’—the presence of specific
prior information relevant to a perceptual decision allows the
generation and representation of conditional expectations at
multiple hierarchical levels in sensory neocortex—the most likely
cause of observed sensory information given (or conditioned
upon) that input. Expectation-related information is projected
backward to the immediately preceding cortical level via reen-
trant pathways, such that forward-flowing sensory input is inter-
preted at each cortical stage within the context of a prior expec-
tation (Figure 1A). Quantitatively, one can thus consider these
representations (blue circles in Figure 1A) to be empirical priors
for a Bayesian inference process occurring at the hierarchical
level immediately below (Friston, 2005).
Predictive coding is useful because it allows us to formulate
some clear hypotheses about how visual regions should be-
have during rudimentary decisions about sensory signals. Spe-
cifically, evoked neural responses (and effective connectivity)
within the sensory neocortex should dissociate decisions in-
formed by specific prior information from judgments that re-
quire an unbiased discrimination between two alternatives. To
address this hypothesis, we devised a paradigm that draws
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Data
(A) According to predictive coding, each hierarchi-
cal layer of a sensory system contains units for er-
ror prediction (red circles) and units for represent-
ing prior expectations (blue circles). Information
flowing forward during perception (red arrows)
evokes a response in error prediction units when
it does not coincide with prior expectations. Infor-
mation about expectations flows backward, gat-
ing sensory input at each cortical stage (blue
arrows). Note similarities with Friston (2005).
(B) Stimuli. Instruction cues (left column) were gray
circles crossed by either a red line and a blue line
separated by 60 (A/B condition, top row) or a gray
circle crossed by a single green line (A/A condi-
tion, middle and bottom rows). Imperative stimuli
were contrast-modulated Gabor patches embed-
ded in visual noise. In the A/B condition, Gabors
were always oriented either as the red line (50%
trials) or the blue line (50% trials); in the A/A con-
dition, Gabors were either oriented as the green
line (match trials, 50%) or with a 60 deviation
from the orientation defined by the green line (non-
match trials, 50%). In separate versions of the
A/A task, either one or two distracters could
appear in a single block.
(C) Task sequence. The instruction cue was fol-
lowed by nine imperative stimuli. Subjects re-
sponded with a button press to each stimulus.
(D) Reaction time data. Reaction times for match
(light gray bars), A/B (gray bars), and nonmatch
(dark gray bars) trials. For A/A blocks (match
and nonmatch), bars marked with 1 and 2 indicate the number of distracters. For A/B blocks, the response A marks that made with the same finger as a match
on the A/A blocks (counterbalanced across subjects). Error bars indicate SEM.
(E) Summary of regions and abbreviations. A large number of regions are discussed in this report. To help the reader understand our results, we include a sche-
matic diagram of the main regions discussed in the text, indicated by their relevant abbreviation (V1c, primary visual cortex; FG, fusiform gyrus; ITG, inferior tem-
poral gyrus; STG, superior temporal gyrus; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex). All regions except the vmPFC had corresponding
partners on the opposite hemisphere, which are not shown. Locations are approximate. Colors indicate the contrast with which the region was defined: red, non-
match > others; blue, A/A > A/B; green, match > others; yellow, PPI connectivity with FG/MOG (see Results for details).upon two tasks traditionally employed in visual psychophysics:
the presence/absence (or ‘‘yes/no’’) judgment and the forced-
choice categorization with two alternatives. Forced-choice dis-
crimination (here, A/B decisions) has often been characterized
as a race between two competing percepts that occurs without
prior bias toward one or the other and that is decided in a win-
ner-takes-all fashion at a downstream processing stage (Ratcl-
iff, 1978). Yes-no judgments (here, A/A decisions), by con-
trast, have been modeled as a biased decision process in
which subjects confirm or disconfirm the match between an in-
ternal ‘‘perceptual template’’ and an external stimulus (Dosher
and Lu, 1999). We view A/A decisions as a special case of
A/B decisions in which one perceptual alternative is repre-
sented in a privileged fashion, allowing perceptual inference
to be reduced to the computationally less burdensome task
of ‘‘matching’’ external sensory input to an internal template
(Dayan et al., 1995). In our task, simple visual stimuli (oriented
Gabor patches) were presented in two interleaved blocks,
one of which (the A/B condition) forced participants to discrim-
inate between two alternatives (i.e., is the orientation A or B?),
whereas another (the A/A condition) explicitly required sub-
jects to match expected and observed information (i.e., is theorientation A or not?). Because the A/B and A/A tasks were
carefully tailored not to differ for bottom-up sensory input, we
reasoned that comparing brain activity on these two decision
tasks would reveal brain regions associated with the represen-
tation of conditional expectations—or, a ‘‘perceptual tem-
plate’’—during decisions about visual stimuli.
Predictive coding shares with many other theories the idea
that evoked cortical responses depend not only on the physical
nature of sensory stimulation but on the confluence of bottom-up
sensory input with top-down signals encoding prior expecta-
tions. Specifically, it proposes that cortical foci falling within
the relevant processing stream will respond more robustly
when there is a mismatch between the observed sensory signal
and the expected perceptual template; these population cortical
responses can thus be considered prediction error signals, and
a single solution for detection/recognition is only recovered
once this prediction error has been jointly eliminated at all levels
of the hierarchy (Friston, 2005). Here, we sought to identify pre-
diction error responses in visual regions by comparing nonmatch
(A) trials, where expected and observed sensory information
are at odds, to all other trial types. According to predictive cod-
ing, such responses should be observed in visual regionsNeuron 59, 336–347, July 31, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 337
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angle of orientation (Friston et al., 2006).
Third, prior information during perceptual decisions should af-
fect not only the height of the evoked response in the sensory
neocortex but also the dynamic flow of neural information among
visual regions. In particular, it has been argued that expectation-
related information flows backward from higher to lower cortical
stages, whereas prediction error responses flow forward (Fris-
ton, 2005). We subjected this view to empirical scrutiny using
dynamic causal modeling (DCM) (Friston et al., 2003), which
models the elements of a brain network as a system governed
by causal mutual interactions with known inputs (experimental
parameters) and outputs (evoked neural data). DCM allowed
us to determine how expectation-related information flowed
within the ventral stream during decisions informed by prior
information (A/A decisions).
Finally, how does the brain respond when a ‘‘match’’ has oc-
curred? Detecting a perceptual match is important not just to
prompt a rapid and efficient behavioral response but also be-
cause it allows the incentive value associated with the expecta-
tion to be adjusted appropriately, and the decision criterion to be
adjusted accordingly. We let this reasoning draw our hypotheses
concerning perceptual matching toward portions of the ventro-
medial prefrontal (vmPFC) and orbitofrontal cortices (OFC) previ-
ously implicated in reward expectation (Kringelbach, 2005),
decision making (Bechara et al., 1994; Wallis, 2007), and
top-down visual perception (Bar et al., 2006b; Kveraga et al.,
2007a; Summerfield et al., 2006). We thus tested our third
hypothesis, that the vmPFC and/or OFC are responsible for per-
ceptual matching—detecting the match between expected and
observed sensation—by searching for voxels that responded
uniquely to match (A) trials on A/A blocks.
In summary, we hypothesized that (1) we would observe neural
prediction error and conditional expectation responses in visual
regions, (2) that effective connectivity between these regions
would be enhanced on decisions informed by prior information
(A/A decisions), and (3) that neural correlates of perceptual
matching would be observed in the ventral prefrontal cortex.
Here, we confirm each of these three hypotheses, using voxel-
wise, functional, and effective connectivity analyses of functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data obtained from healthy
human subjects performing a simple perceptual decision-mak-
ing task.
RESULTS
Both A/B and A/A blocks comprised an instruction cue fol-
lowed by nine successive central, singly presented Gabor
patches with variable orientation, embedded in visual noise
(see Figures 1B–1D and Experimental Procedures). On A/B
blocks, the instruction cue comprised two oriented lines; sub-
jects discriminated whether the orientation of each subsequent
Gabor patch was the same as line A (button 1; 50% of trials) or
line B (button 2; 50% of trials). On A/A blocks, a single oriented
line was shown at instruction; subjects determined whether each
subsequent Gabor patch matched that orientation (button 1;
50% of trials) or not (button 2; 50% of trials). A/A blocks
included target trials interleaved with either a single type of338 Neuron 59, 336–347, July 31, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.distracter trial (i.e., nonmatching Gabor) or two types of distrac-
ter trial. This manipulation prevented subjects from using the
same discrimination strategy on A/B and A/A blocks. All orien-
tations presented within a single block differed from each other
by 60. We additionally varied the contrast of the Gabor patches,
allowing us to model the visibility of the stimuli (and thus the
perceptual demand of the task) as a separate factor.
Behavioral Results
Evidence that simply instructing subjects that one of two stimuli
was the ‘‘target’’ was sufficient to bias their judgments in favor of
that stimulus is provided by reaction time (RT) data (Figure 1D).
Although RTs were overall very well matched between A/B
blocks (729 ± 74 ms) and A/A blocks with both one (725 ±
72 ms) and two (734 ± 78 ms) distracters (main effect of block,
p > 0.4), match trials were reliably faster than nonmatch trials
on A/A blocks, including both those with one distracter (t(19) =
8.05, p < 1 3 107) and two distracters (t(19) = 8.09, p < 1 3
107). Indeed, taking A/B blocks as an RT baseline, A/A match
trials were about 60 ms faster (one distracter: t(19) = 3.83, p <
0.002; two distracters: t(19) = 3.94, p < 1 3 10
4), and nonmatch
trials were about 40 ms slower (one distracter: t(19) = 3.31, p <
0.004; two distracters: t(19) = 4.98, p < 13 10
5) than responses
on A/B trials.
Further analyses indicated that A/A blocks with one and two
distracters did not differ on any of these comparisons (all p
values > 0.1) nor was there a reliable interaction between number
of distracters (n = 1, n = 2) and trial type (match, nonmatch) (p >
0.5). This prompted us to collapse across the two types of A/A
block for subsequent analyses of imaging data. Errors remained
relatively stable at 10% and did not differ between blocks or
trial type (all p values > 0.1); neither did sensitivity calculated
as d prime (p > 0.1).
fMRI Results
In the fMRI results described below, we only report regional ef-
fects if they survived correction for multiple comparisons (over
the appropriate search volume) at a false discovery rate of 0.05.
The p values for regional effects cited below pertain to the
mean activity over voxels that were part of a significant cluster.
Expectation Representation
Comparing fMRI responses on A/A trials relative to A/B trials
revealed a ventral stream network spanning early visual regions
and the anterior temporal pole (Figure 2 and Table S1). Two
regions falling within the occipital cortex exhibited larger
responses on A/A than A/B trials, one on the superior/middle
occipital gyri in Brodmann’s area (BA) 18/19 (MOG; main effect
of block: F(1,19) = 47.8, p < 1 3 10
5) and another lying ventrally
and medially on the fusiform/lingual gyri (FG; F(1,19) = 32.8, p <
1 3 104). Within these clusters, match and nonmatch trials eli-
cited responses that did not differ reliably (both p values > 0.2).
Outside of the visual cortices, preferential responses for A/A
relative to A/B trials were identified in voxels falling close to the
temporal pole (BA 38) bilaterally (F(1,19) = 25.47, p < 1 3 10
5).
This regions fell on the medial aspect of the superior temporal
gyrus (STG). As for visual regions, no difference between match
and nonmatch trials was observed here (p > 0.1).
Neuron
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We identified maximal prediction error responses bilaterally on
the middle/inferior temporal gyrus complex (ITG), straddling BA
19 and 37 (ITG; Figure 3 and Table S2). In ITG, A/A nonmatches
simultaneously elicited larger responses than match trials (t(19) =
4.54, p < 0.001) and larger responses than A/B trials (t(19) = 4.29,
p < 0.001), whereas fMRI responses on match and A/B trials did
not differ (p > 0.6). In the primary visual cortex (V1p), on the me-
dial aspect of the lingual gyrus (responsible for representing the
peripheral visual field), nonmatch trials similarly elicited larger
fMRI responses than A/B trials (t(19) = 5.09, p < 1 3 10
4) and
match trials (t(19) = 3.24, p < 0.005), which did not differ from
one another (p > 0.6).
Additional visual prediction error responses were observed bi-
laterally on the dorsalaspect of the superior occipital gyrus, where
BA 19 meets the parietal lobe (Figure 2). In this region, the advan-
tage for nonmatch trials was largely carried by its difference from
A/B trials (t(19) = 5.80, p < 13 10
4); the comparison nonmatch >
match achieved a more modest level of statistical significance
(t(19) = 2.86, p < 0.01). Indeed, unlike in V1 or ITG, the main effect
of block (A/A trials > A/B trials) was also statistically reliable
F(1,38) = 9.67, p < 0.006), suggesting that this region was engaged
by both prediction error and expectation representation.
Figure 2. Brain Regions Involved in Repre-
senting Prior Expectations
(A) Voxels responding to the contrast A/A > A/B,
thresholded at p < 0.001, uncorrected. The red-
white scale refers to t values.
(B) Parameter estimates for A/B, match, and non-
match trials averaged within ROIs corresponding
to MOG (left), FG (middle), and STG (right).
Error bars indicate SEM.
Functional Interactions among
Visual Regions during
Perceptual Inference
Having identified a brain network for pre-
dictive visual inference that exhibited
characteristic responses in the visual cor-
tices and ventral stream, we turned to
functional connectivity to characterize
regional interactions during perceptual
decisions of an A/A and A/B nature
(Figure 4). Our analysis of functional cou-
pling comprised two steps: first, we used
a psycho-physiological interaction (PPI)
analysis to identify cortical regions whose
responses depended upon the activity of
other reference regions and then as-
sessed the directed effective connectivity
among them using dynamic causal mod-
eling.
Functional Connectivity
(PPI Analyses)
Predictive coding allowed us to hypothe-
size that, during A/A relative to A/B
blocks, information should flow from regions involved in expec-
tation representation (e.g., MOG, FG) to regions demonstrating
error prediction responses (e.g., V1, ITG). Accordingly, within
the ITG ROI as defined above, A/A blocks led to significantly in-
creased functional connectivity with seed regions placed at
MOG (t(19) = 3.22, p < 0.005) and FG (t(19) = 3.89, p < 0.001).
The specificity of this effect to ITG is illustrated in Figure 4A,
where all voxels exhibiting functional connectivity with both
MOG and FG are rendered onto the relevant axial slice (z = 0)
at a joint threshold of p < 0.005, uncorrected. Although neither
MOG nor FG showed increased connectivity with V1p (all p
values > 0.2), a more posterior portion of V1 (involved in repre-
sentation of the central visual field; here, V1c) was also jointly tar-
geted by MOG and FG during A/A blocks, with high statistical
reliability (Figure 4A).
Second, on nonmatch trials, increased information should flow
between early visual regions involved in orientation representa-
tion (such as V1) and ITG, reflecting the higher weight afforded
to bottom-up information when conditional expectations are
not sufficient to explain the causes of sensation. We thus esti-
mated a second PPI, searching across the brain for voxels
whose correlation with a seed region planted at ITG increased
on nonmatch trials relative to other trial types (Figure 4B). AsNeuron 59, 336–347, July 31, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 339
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ITG and V1c (t(19) = 3.12, p < 0.006).
Forward and Backward Connectivity (DCM Analyses)
Predictive coding argues that whereas sensory evoked re-
sponses—reflecting prediction error—flow forward within the
cortical hierarchy, information about prior expectations flows
backward. Because PPIs do not carry information about the di-
rection of flow of information between brain regions, we next
turned to DCM, which draws upon concepts from systems the-
ory to model how observed fMRI activations depend on both
the experimental variables and the circulation of neural informa-
tion within an anatomically plausible brain network (Friston et al.,
2003). DCM calculates the statistical likelihood that an evoked
response is driven by the flow of information from another brain
area with which it is interconnected (monosynaptically or other-
wise), leading to the derivation of modulatory parameters (bilin-
ear terms) expressing the extent to which unidirectional effective
connectivity between these regions varies as a function of stim-
ulus inputs or experimental context. We equate information
‘‘flow’’ with the influence that activity in a source region has on
the rate of change of neuronal states in a target region, encoded
directly by the parameters of the DCM that are estimated below.
Building upon the PPI results, our DCM analyses posed two
questions: first, does information flow forward or backward or re-
ciprocally between V1c and ITG on nonmatch trials? Second,
does expectation-related information flow from FG to V1c, or
Figure 3. Neural Prediction Error Re-
sponses
(A) Voxels responding to the contrast nonmatch >
(A/B and match), thresholded at p < 0.001, uncor-
rected. The red-white scale refers to the t value at
each significant voxel.
(B) Parameter estimates for A/B, match, and non-
match trials averaged within ROIs corresponding
to V1p (left), sV3 (middle), and ITG (right).
Error bars indicate SEM.
from FG to ITG, or both? (The selected re-
gions of interest are shown in Figure 4C.
We focused on FG because it yielded
more robust effects in the PPIs and be-
cause the parameter estimates observed
here were positive-going and thus more
easily interpretable.) Combining these
questions created a family of nine possi-
ble DCMs, and we used Bayesian model
comparison to obtain statistical esti-
mates of which model offered the opti-
mum balance between simplicity and fit
to the data (Penny et al., 2004).
We began with a standard model de-
scribing the influence of three parameters
on effective connectivity: (1) simple visual
stimulation, independent of condition
(photic), (2) the main effect of the A/A
task, relative to the A/B task (A/A), and
(3) the effect due to A/A nonmatch trials, relative to other trial
types (nonmatch). In the standard model, visual information
(photic) entered the model at V1c, and expectation-related infor-
mation (A/A) entered at the STG; intrinsic connectivity was
specified in reciprocal, hierarchical fashion (between primary
and extrastriate cortices, within the extrastriate cortex, and
from the extrastriate cortex to the STG); forward modulatory
connectivity from V1c to ITG increased with photic, and back-
ward connectivity from the STG to FG increased with A/A.
Nine model variants were created by building upon this standard
model with combinations of the modulatory effective connec-
tions described above. The different patterns of modulatory con-
nectivity (on a full reciprocal intrinsic connectivity) expressed in
each variant is reported in Figure 4E.
Bayesian model comparison preferred the model in which
nonmatch trials led to enhanced forward connectivity from V1c
to ITG, whereas A/A trials led to increased backward connec-
tivity from FG to V1c (Figure 4D and Tables S4 and S5). In this
model, photic enhanced forward connectivity from V1c to ITG
(t(19) = 4.68, p < 0.001, 1.91% increase over baseline), A/A sig-
nificantly enhanced backward connectivity from FG to V1 (t(19) =
2.67, p < 0.02, 2.48% increase), and nonmatch increased con-
nectivity from V1c to ITG (t(19) = 3.32, p < 0.004, 2.23% increase).
Intrinsic but not modulatory connectivity was significant be-
tween STG and V4 (t(19) = 3.27, p < 0.004), and driving input to
V1 and STG was, as expected, highly significant (all p values
< 0.001). This model thus supports the view espoused by340 Neuron 59, 336–347, July 31, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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tivity among Visual Regions
(A) PPI results 1: voxels exhibiting reliable in-
creases in connectivity with both MOG and FG
during A/A blocks relative to A/B blocks, ren-
dered at a joint threshold of p < 0.005, uncorrected.
Voxels in the right panel overlap heavily with ITG.
(B) PPI results II: voxels exhibiting reliable in-
creases in functional connectivity with ITG on non-
match trials (relative to match and A/B trials).
(C) ROIs used for DCM analyses. V1c (green) was
defined by its overlapping sensitivity to the PPIs
described in (A) and (B). V1c exhibited highly signif-
icant positive-going responses on all trials that did
not differ as a function of condition. ITG (red), FG
(blue), and STG (cyan) are defined by the analyses
described in Figures 2 and 3.
(D) The optimal DCM. BMC indicated that the opti-
mal DCM, chosen from a space of nine models,
was characterized by enhanced forward connec-
tivity from V1c to ITG following all visual events
(green box, photic) and nonmatch trials (red box)
in particular. By contrast, backward connectivity
from FG to V1c increased on A/A trials (blue
boxes). Intrinsic connectivity is signaled by black
(significant, p < 0.05) or gray (nonsignificant) intrin-
sic connectivity. Driving input from photic to V1 (p <
1 3 1012) and from A/A to STG (p < 1 3 103)
were also significant. Asterisks refer to signifi-
cance for one-sample t tests conducted over sub-
jects: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
(E) All DCMs. Each of the nine DCMs was charac-
terized by a different pattern of modulatory con-
nectivity. The winning model was model 1.predictive coding that information about prior expectations (spe-
cific to A/A trials) flows backward (e.g., from FG to V1), whereas
nonmatch trials lead to increased forward flow of information
from lower to higher regions (V1 to ITG).
Perceptual Matching
We predicted that the vmPFC/OFC would respond to perceptual
matches, that is, would exhibit the largest responses whenever
there was a coincidence between expected and observed per-
ceptual information. Correspondingly, the vmPFC was more ro-
bustly activated by A/A match than nonmatch trials (t(19) = 5.13,
p < 13 104) and by A/A match than A/B trials (t(19) = 4.63, p <
0.001), whereas nonmatch and A/B trials elicited similar re-
sponses (p > 0.3) (Figure 5). Statistical significance for the OFC
was more modest (match > A/B trials, t(19) = 3.8, p < 0.002;
match > nonmatch trials, t(19) = 3.33, p < 0.004; A/B > nonmatch,
p > 0.7). The posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) responded in a
similar fashion (match > nonmatch: t(19) = 4.37, p < 0.001;
match > A/B: t(19) = 4.36, p < 0.001), with no difference for non-
match > A/B trials (p > 0.9). Control analyses rule out task diffi-
culty as an alternative explanation for the results obtained in
vmPFC and PCC (Supplemental Results 1).
DISCUSSION
Psychophysical detection (yes-no) and discrimination (forced
choice) judgments have historically been considered indicesof a common decision process (Swets, 1964). However, we
observed striking differences in the brain activity elicited by
these two types of perceptual judgment. Brain regions within
the visual cortex (MOG and FG) and at the apex of the ventral
stream (STG) were more active during A/A decisions, that is,
judgments that were informed by specific prior information about
forthcoming stimulation. Other visual regions showed prediction
error responses and ventral frontal and medial parietal sites re-
sponded to perceptual matching when expected and observed
sensory information coincide. Together, these results describe
a network for ‘‘predictive’’ perceptual decision making that links
the visual cortex with ventral prefrontal sites previously impli-
cated in decision making and reward (Bechara et al., 1994;
Rushworth et al., 2007; Wallis, 2007).
How, precisely, do decision strategies differ on A/A and A/B
judgments? Behavioral data revealed that, on A/A blocks,
match trials elicited very rapid responses, whereas nonmatch tri-
als elicited slower responses relative to the baseline set by A/B
responding. This phenomenon replicates the classically de-
scribed RT advantage for ‘‘same’’ over ‘‘different’’ judgments
in perceptual comparison tasks, known as the ‘‘fast-same’’ ef-
fect (Egeth, 1966; Farell, 1985). Conceiving of the decision as
a diffusion (or ‘‘random walk’’) process in which sensory informa-
tion in favor of one alternative or another is serially accumulated
toward a decision threshold—a quantitative description of the
decision process that has been successful in explaining both be-
havioral (Ratcliff, 1978) and neural (Kim and Shadlen, 1999)Neuron 59, 336–347, July 31, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 341
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planations for this effect. First, it could be that, on A/A blocks,
the mere presence of prior information biases the origin of the
random walk toward the threshold for ‘‘same’’ judgments (i.e.,
toward A and away from A), rendering RTs for A shorter, and
for A longer, than for A/B judgments where the diffusion pro-
cessing begins equidistant from the thresholds for A and B. By
this account, because conditional expectations (reflecting the
anticipation of one favored perceptual alternative) are already
present in the visual system, less bottom-up sensory information
has to be accumulated for perception to be completed and the
decision threshold breached (Carpenter and Williams, 1995).
Another possibility is that the acquisition of sensory informa-
tion is actively modulated by expectations, for example as pro-
cessing in lower visual region is biased in favor of the condition-
ally expected target represented in higher regions (Friston, 2005).
This top-down biasing in the visual hierarchy can be seen as
a gain control mechanism, whereby ‘‘same’’ (or ‘‘A’’) information
is accumulated more rapidly toward threshold once the diffusion
process has begun, upon receipt of priors from higher stages of
the processing hierarchy. Below, we discuss or fMRI data in the
light of these two putative mechanisms of biased decision mak-
ing, arguing that both processes may be occurring in our task.
Expectation Representation
Two extrastriate cortex regions were more active during A/A
decisions than A/B decisions. Critically, these activations are
Figure 5. Brain Regions Involved in Match-
ing Expected and Observed Perceptual
Information
(A) Voxels responding to the contrast match > (A/B
and nonmatch), thresholded at p < 0.001, uncor-
rected. The red-white scale refers to t values.
(B) Parameter estimates for A/B, match, and non-
match trials averaged within ROIs corresponding
to the PCC, vmPFC, and OFC.
Error bars indicate SEM.
not attributable to differences in the type
or nature of sensory stimulation, as the
train of stimuli presented in A/A and
A/B blocks was carefully equated for its
physical characteristics. Nor is this effect
likely to be due to differences in the de-
ployment of attention or the level of cogni-
tive demand between the two conditions,
as behavioral data indicated that—on av-
erage—accuracy and RTs were statisti-
cally indistinguishable between blocks.
Our study thus differs from previous re-
search in which attention was biased to-
ward one task-relevant visual feature or
dimension and away from another (Desi-
mone and Duncan, 1995; Kastner et al.,
1999) in that both A/A and A/B condi-
tions required subjects to attend equally
to the same stimulus dimension (angle
of orientation). Instead, we argue that these MOG and FG activa-
tions reflect the privileged maintenance of prior information—in
this case, an anticipated target orientation—against which each
incoming sensory stimulus is compared. This view is consistent
with the neurophysiological recordings demonstrating that, in
the visual cortex, extrastriate regions including MOG and FG con-
tain orientation-tuned neurons (Desimone et al., 1985; Pasupathy
and Connor, 2002) and fMRI studies revealing orientation-specific
adaptation effects in these regions (Boynton and Finney, 2003).
However, our connectivity analyses also revealed that direc-
tion-specific backward projections from FG to V1 were en-
hanced on A/A relative to A/B blocks. One interpretation of
this finding is that these regions also contribute actively to the
decision process by projecting back expectation-related signals
to guide processing of orientation-related information in earlier
visual regions, such as V1 (Hubel and Wiesel, 1968). A plausible
anatomical basis for such backprojections has been described
in the macaque (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991; Shipp and
Zeki, 1989), and a causal role for reentrant connections between
cortical stages in the formation of a visual percept has been pre-
viously demonstrated in humans (with TMS) and other primates
(with regional cooling), where temporarily inactivating visual
area MT has been shown to disrupt figure-ground segmentation,
in the latter case by weakening center-surround interactions in
hierarchically lower regions, V1, V2, and MOG (Hupe et al.,
1998; Pascual-Leone and Walsh, 2001). These findings thus
contribute to a growing literature emphasizing the importance342 Neuron 59, 336–347, July 31, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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man, 2007).
Another consequence of our tight control over the sequence of
stimulation in A/A and A/B blocks is that statistically both A
and A, and A and B were equiprobable, and thus the neural
and behavioral biases observed on A/A blocks are not attribut-
able to the brain tracking higher-order likelihoods of occurrence
of a given stimulus. Rather, these biases probably occur be-
cause prior knowledge is available about the possible presence
of a single stimulus exemplar. This bias may constitute an innate
tendency to anticipate the persistence of a currently available
percept, an ecologically plausible assumption in particular in
the visual domain, where objects exhibit a gestalt constancy
and sensory signals tend to be highly autocorrelated.
Although we argue that A/A blocks engendered a height-
ened expectation of a specific orientation, there are other pro-
cesses that were probably common to both blocks. For exam-
ple, both blocks required information about the appropriate
response contingencies to be sustained. One possibility is
that these more general short-term storage mechanisms are as-
sociated with the engagement of parietal and prefrontal cortex
(PFC) regions known to be tonically active when information is
held active across delay (Fuster, 1973). Indeed, fMRI activity
that diverged strongly from the resting baseline but that did
not differ between A/B or A/A conditions was observed in pa-
rietal and prefrontal regions (Figure S1 and Table S6). These re-
gions may be particularly important for maintenance processes
that guard the instructed target representation from potentially
interfering information arising from the distracter stimuli or other
sources (Sakai et al., 2002). By contrast, the sustained signals
occurring uniquely during A/A decisions may be closely allied
to that which accompanies mental imagery or during autobio-
graphical reminiscence (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis
and Maguire, 2007), cognitive processes that may also require
the creation and monitoring of a ‘‘generative model’’ of visual
scenes or objects.
Prediction Error
During an orientation judgment task, we observed perceptual
mismatch responses in ITG, a visual region known to be involved
in processing simple stimuli defined by their orientation (Larsson
and Heeger, 2006). We interpret these activations as reflecting
‘‘prediction error’’ signals occur in task-specific visual cortical re-
gions, akin to those described in prefrontal and midbrain struc-
tures following the surprising presence or absence of a reward
during reinforcement learning (O’Doherty et al., 2003). Prediction
error signals might reflect the expanded neurocognitive process-
ing needed to reconcile two sources of information: those arising
from prior expectations and those from observation. Indeed, it
has been argued that prediction error responses are ubiquitous
throughout the brain, and the monitoring of sensory surprise
may be a cardinal feature of many biological systems (Friston
et al., 2006). Computationalmodels have proposedplausible neu-
ral architectures giving rise to sensory error prediction responses,
for example, those in which population cortical responses repre-
sent a posterior probability distribution (Deneve, 2008).
How might prediction error signals contribute to perceptual
decision making? One possibility is that (consistent with the con-tention that on A/A blocks, the origin of a diffusion process is
biased toward the match threshold) nonmatch trials simply re-
quire more information to be accumulated in order to confirm
that a nonmatch has occurred and, consequently, more accom-
panying processing in extrastriate visual regions sensitive to the
critical dimension (orientation). If ITG is participating in the accu-
mulation of information about orientation, this would explain its
enhanced responsivity to nonmatch over match trials. Our con-
nectivity analyses additionally suggest that, where a nonmatch
is detected, greater weight may be placed upon forward-flowing
sensory evidence and less upon backward-flowing, expecta-
tion-related signals in order to rapidly reconcile disparities
between what was anticipated and what was observed.
Previous studies have reported that, even when visual stimuli
are presented rapidly or are degraded to optimally tax the per-
ceptual decision system, neural signals distinguishing match
and nonmatch trials can diverge as early as 150 ms following
stimulus onset (Bar et al., 2006b; Thorpe et al., 1996). Perceptual
decisions thus can occur very rapidly—perhaps too rapidly for
a prolonged, iterative adjustment of predictions and evidence.
Expectations thus might impinge on lower hierarchical stages
in the form of a rapid ‘‘initial guess,’’ which under normal viewing
conditions might critically contain low spatial-frequency informa-
tion, leaving perception of finer detail to bottom-up mechanisms
(Bar et al., 2006b). Recent studies have raised the intriguing pos-
sibility that the ventral prefrontal cortex might be the origin of
such signals (Bar et al., 2006b; Kveraga et al., 2007a).
The observed differences in the neural concomitants of match
and nonmatch events complement an earlier study in which sub-
jects viewed more complex visual objects, such as faces and
buildings. Face-responsive portions of the fusiform gyrus ex-
hibited stronger responses to faces during a face-matching
task than a control task, i.e., enhanced match responses (Sum-
merfield et al., 2006). Because predictive coding suggests that,
during a hierarchical recognition process, activations at a higher
levels ‘‘complete’’ lower-level perceptual signals with prior per-
ceptual codes, it follows that match-suppression (prediction er-
ror) responses should be observed in earlier visual regions and
match- enhancements in higher regions (such as those involved
in the processing of facial identity). Further support for this view
comes from studies demonstrating reduced fMRI responses in
early regions and enhancements to those in later regions during
perception of coherent relative to incoherent objects (Murray
et al., 2002) and moving dot patterns (Harrison et al., 2007).
Perceptual Matching
Finally, in a third major result, we demonstrate that the ventral
prefrontal cortex (including the OFC and the VMPFC) and the
PCC respond to the match between expected and observed in-
formation. Control analyses demonstrated that these activations
were not an artifact of match trials simply requiring less effort
and/or shorter processing times. How, then, might these regions
contribute to perceptual decision making?
Ventral prefrontal and medial parietal regions are known for
their sensitivity to ‘‘old’’ over ‘‘new’’ items in recognition memory
tasks (Wagner et al., 2005), a distinction that is very similar to that
made between match over nonmatch trials here. Moreover, they
are known to respond in a directionally signed fashion to theNeuron 59, 336–347, July 31, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 343
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an earlier cue (O’Doherty et al., 2003; Wallis, 2007), suggesting
a role in processing the likely outcome encoded by a stimulus-
stimulus association (Rushworth et al., 2007). One possibility is
that the presence of a perceptual match—a ‘‘hit’’—is a reinforcer
in that it confirms the value and/or validity of the conditional
expectations as a feasible internal model of the external world.
Under conditions in which matches are scarce or absent, the
perceptual template is a poor reflection of actual sensory infor-
mation, and one would correspondingly expect it to be main-
tained less robustly, with concomitant behavioral effects (such
as a reduction in the RT benefit for matches over nonmatches).
One interpretation, thus, is that ventral PFC/ PCC activations
on match trials may thus reflect the receipt of prediction error
signals from visual regions, in the service of reinforcing internally
represented expectations during perceptual matching.
One line of evidence favoring this view is that tasks that are
most impaired following damage to the vmPFC/OFC tend to
be those that benefit from the creation, monitoring, and updating
of an internal or ‘‘model-based’’ representation of the external
world. For example, state-based accounts of probabilistic rever-
sal learning of visual discriminations outperform simple rein-
forcement-learning accounts in describing human behavioral
performance on the task, and the strength of the ‘‘prior’’ associ-
ated with one model over another increases in a fashion corre-
lated with vmPFC activity (Daw et al., 2006; Hampton et al.,
2006). The vmPFC may thus be responsible for assigning value
to internal representations, such as that for the perceptual ‘‘tem-
plate’’ corresponding to the anticipated orientation in our study.
The response on match trials may thus reflect a boost to sub-
jects’ confidence in their template upon receiving coinciding
sensory input (Koechlin et al., 2002), which will in turn minimize
the surprise associated with future repetitions of that sensory
event (Friston et al., 2006).
Another interesting possibility is that the ventral prefrontal re-
gions (in particular the OFC) contribute actively to the recognition
process and are themselves the source of top-down signals re-
sponsible for guiding object recognition on the basis of expecta-
tions. Bar and colleagues have argued that incoming visual
information is routed via orbitofrontal structures before being
projected back to the extrastriate visual cortex, this backward
connection offering an ‘‘initial guess’’ as to the identity of an ob-
ject that consists principally of low spatial frequency information
(Bar et al., 2006a). Although we did not include any of the ventral
prefrontal ROIs in our DCM (to preserve model simplicity and
because fMRI activity showed the opposite pattern to visual
regions, making mutual interdependency in their evoked BOLD
responses unlikely), we have previously shown that top-down
connectivity from vmPFC to face-responsive voxels on the fusi-
form gyrus is enhanced by matching judgments about faces
(Summerfield et al., 2006). Similarly, a DCM proposing top-
down connectivity from the OFC was the best explanation of
visual activations where magnocellular (low spatial frequency)
information was emphasized (Kveraga et al., 2007a). Indeed, it
is noteworthy that fiber bundles linking the ventral visual stream
with the vmPFC are known to pass through the superior medial
aspect of the anterior temporal cortex (Saleem et al., 2008), pre-
cisely where an additional cluster responding to prior visual infor-344 Neuron 59, 336–347, July 31, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.mation was observed in the current study. The possibility that the
ventral PFC receives prediction error signals and/or intervenes
directly in top-down object recognition is likely to constitute a fer-
tile topic for future investigation (Kveraga et al., 2007b).
As is often observed in fMRI studies, activity in the vmPFC,
OFC, and PCC deviated negatively from resting baseline, that
is, although these regions were ‘‘less deactivated’’ by matches
than nonmatches, signal levels were yet higher in the quiet rest
periods between blocks (Gusnard et al., 2001). Although this ob-
servation does not necessarily alter the functional significance
of the cognitive subtraction described above (Morcom and
Fletcher, 2007), by way of explanation, we speculate that the
higher activity levels observed in the vmPFC, OFC, and PCC at
rest could reflect a constant fulfillment of sensory expectations
that occurs whenever stimulus entropy is low and the unfolding
sequence of sensory events is highly predictable—at rest, the
brain is in a state of constant matching.
Although our study was carried out with simple, artificial stim-
uli, we believe that our results are relevant to a wider literature
concerning the perception and recognition of complex objects.
For example, the biasing mechanisms described above might
come into play when perceiving objects in a congruent context.
In support of this view, the PCC is more activated by objects with
an unambiguous contextual association (Bar and Aminoff, 2003),
leading to the suggesting that it contributes to the encoding
of associative information about visual objects and scenes
(Bar, 2007).
Conclusions
We report evidence that visual cortical regions represent expec-
tations and exhibit ‘‘prediction error’’ responses during decisions
of an A/A type—those with an explicit matching component.
Connectivity analyses suggest that prediction error responses
flow forward and expectation-related information flows back-
ward, allowing incoming sensory information to be constrained
by prior information at each stage of the cortical hierarchy. These
results offer empirical support for an emerging quantitative the-
ory of perceptual inference (Friston, 2005). Finally, we argue
that ventral prefrontal and posterior cingulate regions also con-
tribute to perceptual inference by signaling the presence of
a match between expected and observed perceptual informa-
tion. Collectively, these data describe a cortical network for deci-
sions informed by prior information that links visual regions with
prefrontal cortical sites implicated in decision making and reward
(Bechara et al., 1994; Rushworth et al., 2007; Wallis, 2007).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Twenty neurologically normal individuals between the ages of 20 and 26 par-
ticipated in the experiment. Subjects all had normal or corrected-to-normal vi-
sion and were recruited on campus at the Universite´ Pierre et Marie Curie in
Paris, France. Subjects all gave informed consent during an interview with
our on-site physician and were paid 120 Euros for their participation.
Stimuli
All stimuli were generated and presented using PsychToolBox (Brainard, 1997)
and appeared on a uniform gray background. The experiment consisted of 48
blocks of nine stimuli divided into four experimental runs of 8 min. Each run
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Prior Information during Perceptual Inferencebegan with 10 s lead in and ended with 20 s lead out. Each block began with
an instruction cue for 3 s, followed by the gray background screen for a ran-
domly determined interval of1.5 s (range 1–2 s). Instruction cues were darker
gray circles crossed by a single green line (A/A condition) or by a red and
a blue line (A/B condition). A rest period of 6 s (range 4–8 s) was interposed
between blocks. Stimuli were Gabor patches (sine wave gratings enveloped by
a Gaussian) of 1.6 cycles/, subtending 3.8 visual arc, with nine equally dis-
tributed contrast levels ranging from 1.2% to 11.0%, added to a noise back-
ground. Gabor patches were presented for 1.5 s with an interstimulus interval
of 1.5 s (drawn from a uniform distribution with range 1–2 s). Subjects made
an unprompted response during stimulus presentation. No feedback was
given.
Design
A/B blocks (n = 24) and A/A blocks (n = 24) occurred in alternation with the
first block randomly determined in each run. On A/B blocks, orientation A
was drawn from a uniform random distribution and differed from orientation
B by exactly 60. Subjects were instructed to memorize the instruction cue
and respond with button 1 if the Gabor patch was oriented identically to the
blue line and button 2 if it was oriented identically to the red line. On half of
the A/A blocks (n = 12), the stimulus train was identical to A/B blocks, i.e.,
two Gabor patches of orientation that differed by 60. On the remaining
A/A blocks, two distracter Gabor patches, each differing from the target
patch by 60, were presented. Subjects were instructed to memorize the in-
struction cue and respond with button 1 if the Gabor patch was oriented iden-
tically to the green line and button 2 if it was not. On average across all A/A
blocks, half of the trials were A and half were not; on average across all A/B
blocks, half of the trials were A and half were B. Responses were made with
the index (left) and middle (right) finger of the right hand. The response keys
used by the subject (index, middle finger) were fully counterbalanced within
and between both conditions.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Magnetic resonance images were acquired with a Siemens (Erlangen, Ger-
many) Allegra 3.0T scanner to acquire gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-pla-
nar images with blood oxygenation level-dependent contrast as an index of lo-
cal increases in synaptic activity. The image parameters used were as follows:
matrix size, 64 3 64; voxel size, 3 3 3 mm; echo time, 40 ms; repetition time,
2000 ms. A functional image volume comprised 32 contiguous slices of 3 mm
thickness (with a 1 mm interslice gap), which ensured that the whole brain was
within the field of view.
Behavioral Analyses
Behavioral data were analyzed with t tests and ANOVAs, with an a of p < 0.05.
Post hoc comparisons between match and A/B trials, and nonmatch and
A/B trials, were always made by comparing responses made with the same
finger.
fMRI Analyses: Preprocessing
Imaging data were analyzed with SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, University College London, UK, (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm/spm2.html). Image treatment followed a standard preprocessing stream
in which functional T2* images were slice-timing corrected and spatially real-
igned to the first volume acquired. The first five functional scans from each task
were discarded prior to the subsequent analyses. Transformation parameters
were derived from normalizing the coregistered mean echo planar image to
a corresponding template brain within the stereotactic space of the Montreal
Neurological Institute, and the derived parameters were then applied to nor-
malize the remaining echo planar volumes for that subject. Normalized images
were resampled at 53 53 5 mm and then smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of
10 3 10 3 10 mm full-width half-maximum. A 128 s temporal high-pass filter
was applied in order to exclude low-frequency artifacts. Temporal correlations
were estimated using restricted maximum likelihood estimates of variance
components using a first-order autoregressive model. The resulting nonspher-
icity was used to form maximum likelihood estimates of the activations.Conventional SPM Analyses
Conventional SPM analyses included seven task regressors: the instruction
cues for (1) A/A and (2) A/B; (3) match and (4) nonmatch trials for the A/A
blocks; corresponding (5) A and (6) B responses for A/B blocks, and (7) errors.
All regression analyses also included a parameter encoding the mean signal
from 1000 randomly selected voxels from the space outside the brain in a fur-
ther attempt to eliminate scanner noise. SPMs were obtained at the second
(between-subject) level with one sample t tests on the following contrasts:
prediction error (Figure 2): [0 0 1 3 1 1 0]; expectation representation
(Figure 3): [0 0 1 1 1 1 0]; match detection (Figure 5): [0 0 3 1 1 1 0].
SPMs in Figures 2A, 3A, and 5A are visualized at p < 0.001, extent threshold
5 voxels (0.625 ml) uncorrected for multiple comparisons, but all clusters re-
ported in the text survived false discovery rate (FDR) correction for multiple
comparisons (Genovese et al., 2002). The clusters shown above each bar
graph are at variable thresholds and are for display purposes only. The cluster
maxima (Montreal Neurological Institute coordinate system) and associated
FDR corrected p values are reported in accompanying Supplemental Tables.
Statistical values reported in the text were obtained by extracting second-level
contrast values from the mean of the relevant cluster from the SPM (thresh-
olded at uncorrected p < 0.001) and performing conventional ANOVA or t tests
on these data. A summary of the major regions discussed is shown in
Figure 1E.
PPI Analyses
Seed voxels for MOG, FG, ITG, and more anterior brain regions were defined
individually for each subject as the peak voxel sensitive to the appropriate con-
trast falling within the relevant cluster (defined at p < 0.001, uncorrected, at the
group level). Using standard analysis techniques, the ‘‘physiological’’ time se-
ries extracted at this voxel was corrected for variance associated with param-
eters of no interest, deconvolved with the haemodynamic responses, multi-
plied by a parameter encoding the relevant ‘‘psychological’’ contrast (e.g.,
A/A > A/B), and reconvolved to form a ‘‘psychophysiological interaction’’
(PPI) regressor. This regressor was entered into a design matrix alongside pa-
rameters encoding the main effects of the contrast and time series indepen-
dently, as well as nuisance regressor encoding instructions and errors (i.e., re-
gressors 1, 2, and 7, see above). Results are reported with an a of p < 0.05,
uncorrected, within ROIs defined in an a priori fashion by conventional SPM
analyses.
DCM Analyses
A new design matrix with six regressors was constructed for DCM analyses,
with nuisance regressors 1, 2, and 7 corresponding to the instructions and er-
ror trials, plus three regressors of interest: photic (all trials), A/A (all trials in
A/A blocks), and nonmatch (all nonmatch A/A trials). New SPMs associated
with these three regressors were used to define individual subject peaks for
V1c, ITG, and FG, all of which nevertheless fell within the bounds of their cor-
responding cluster from conventional SPM analyses. Voxels of interest were
extracted as for PPI analyses.
We constructed nine DCMs encapsulating variable patterns of forward,
backward, and reciprocal connectivity among V1c, FG, ITG, and STG during
photic, A/A, and nonmatch. These models were then compared in a pairwise
fashion using Bayesian model comparison in order to identify the model offer-
ing an optimal tradeoff between complexity and goodness of fit. Bayesian
model comparisons calculates Bayes factors reflecting the optimality of one
of two competing models, corresponding to the ratio of the probability of the
data y given the model 1, or p(yjm1), to the probability of the data given model 2,
or p(yjm2). Model evidence is adjusted according to Bayesian (BIC) and Akaike
(AIC) criteria, the former of which favors simpler models and the latter more
complex models: by an established convention, comparisons for which both
of these Bayes factors exceed the exponential of 1 (2.718) reflect positive
evidence in favor of one model over another. At the group level, a group Bayes
factor can be established by taking the product of minimum Bayes factor (AIC
or BIC) across the cohort. Confirmation that the group Bayes factor is not
driven by outlying data is offered by the ‘‘positive evidence ratio,’’ the ratio
of subjects displaying evidence (BF > 1) in favor of model 1 to those displaying
evidence in favor of model 2 (BF < 1). In Supplemental Data, we describe allNeuron 59, 336–347, July 31, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 345
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Prior Information during Perceptual Inferencenine models, along with their Bayes factors and positive evidence ratios and in
pairwise competition with each of the eight other models.
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
The Supplemental Data include tables, figures, and Supplemental Results and
can be found with this article online at http://www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/
59/2/336/DC1/.
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